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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates how IT-enabled monitoring 
systems mitigate moral hazard in an online labor market 
and their effect on market competition.  We exploit a 
quasi-experiment at Freelancer when it introduced an 
IT-enabled monitoring system in 2015. We use a 
difference-in-differences (DID) approach to identify the 
treatment effect of the monitoring system on employer 
contractor choice, market competition, and employer 
surplus. We found that the IT-enabled monitoring 
system lowers the employers’ willingness to pay the 
reputation premiums. Meanwhile, comparing the trend 
of the control group, the IT-enabled monitoring system 
raised the employer surplus in hourly projects and 
increased the number of bids. Our result suggests that 
IT-enabled monitoring systems have a significant effect 
on alleviating moral hazards, reducing agency costs, 
and facilitating market competition. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Information technology has a profound effect on firm 
boundaries [1-3].  As IT reduces transaction costs, firms 
increasingly resort to market mechanisms such as 
outsourcing and offshoring for service procurement.  
Online labor markets are at the forefront of this 
phenomenon. In the past few decades, online labor 
markets have undergone a tremendous growth. For 
example, by December 2015, there were over 9 million 
projects posted in Freelancer, one of the most prominent 
online labor markets, and about 17 million registered 
users have used the platform to look for job 
opportunities.  
Despite the tremendous growth, online labor markets 
have their limitations due to information asymmetry and 
agency problems between contractors and employers, 
amplified by spatial and temporal separations [4, 5]. 
Moreover, because the monitoring and control 
mechanisms to ensure work performance [6] are weaker 
and indirect in online labor markets [7], it’s easier for 
opportunistic contractors to shirk and misrepresent their 
effort. A common solution to this agency problem is the 
use of fixed-price contracts, where payment is outcome-
driven. That is, contractors can’t get the fixed payment 
until they complete the projects successfully [8]. 
Therefore, the contractors’ dominant strategy for is to 
complete the projects, which alleviates the moral hazard 
issues [9].  
An alternative to fixed-price contracts is hourly 
contracts, where payment is determined based on the 
amount of hours the contractors have spent and the 
hourly wages [8]. While hourly contracts provide a 
stronger incentive for better project performance [8] and 
have better applicability to complex contexts [10, 11], 
they also offer the contractors monetary incentives to 
shirk. Therefore, information asymmetry in online labor 
markets renders moral hazard problems of hourly 
projects more prominent [10].  
To alleviate moral hazard issues in online labor markets, 
many online labor platforms started to provide 
automatic tracking functionality [12]. For instance, 
Freelancer released an enhanced tracking feature in its 
application since August 2nd, 2015.  In this study, we 
analyze how such an enhanced monitoring system 
would influence employers’ and contractors’ behavior 
and welfare. In particular, we address three research 
questions: First, do monitoring systems help alleviate 
the moral hazard problems, and thus lower employers’ 
preference for reputable bidders? Second, if monitoring 
systems indeed change employer preference, how does 
such a change influence the market competition? Third, 
given its impact on the market competition, how do 
monitoring systems affect employer surplus?  
We propose a number of hypotheses based on the 
agency theory and we expect the enhanced monitoring 
systems to have a significant effect on alleviating the 
moral hazard problems in hourly contracts relative to 
fixed-price contracts. We analyze how the enhanced 
monitoring feature affect both the demand and the 
supply sides of the hourly project market. Our 
identification is based on a quasi-natural experiment 
(release of enhanced offline tracking feature in the 
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Freelancer application), in which we consider hourly 
projects as the treatment group and fixed-price projects 
as the control group. With a large dataset including 
36,407 projects posted on Freelancer, we use a 
difference-in-differences (DID) approach to identify the 
treatment effect of the system introduction on employer 
contractor decision, market competition, and employer 
surplus.  Our analysis suggests that after the introduction 
of the enhanced monitoring systems, employers show 
less preference for bidders with high-reputation, and 
thus be less willing to pay the reputation premiums. 
Further, this treatment fosters market competition for 
hourly projects by increasing number of bids on hourly 
contracts by 15.7% and increases the employer surplus 
in hourly projects.  
Our paper makes three key contributions. First, our 
paper is a large-scale empirical research to investigate 
the effect of IT-enabled monitoring systems on 
employer and contractor decisions in online labor 
markets, which extends prior research on the contract 
design in labor markets [9, 13, 14].  Second, this paper 
contributes to research on reputation systems in online 
platforms. While the previous literature focused on the 
effect of reputation systems on agency problems [7, 15, 
16], our study investigated the effect of monitoring 
systems and their interaction with reputation systems. 
Third, this study deepens our understanding of the 
design of online labor markets [4, 5], specifically, we 
extend the understanding of designing IT-enabled 
monitoring systems to alleviate moral hazard problems, 
reduce agency costs, and facilitate competition in online 
labor markets. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
theoretical background followed by the hypotheses 
development section. In Section 3, we introduced the 
data description and empirical models. Finally, we 
discussed the overall findings and implications. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1. Online labor markets 
 
Online labor markets, which aims to facilitate the 
procurement of labor services from all over the world 
[4], have grown dramatically during recent years. But 
information asymmetry persists in such markets because 
contractors’ qualities and their actual effort levels are 
hard to observe. Therefore, agency problems are 
prevailing in online labor markets.  
The first type of common agency problems that has 
attracted attention from both the practice and academic 
scholars is the adverse selection problem. Adverse 
selection problems are caused by the asymmetric 
distribution of information and the difficulties in 
evaluating the contractors’ capabilities and skills [5, 17]. 
In order to alleviate the adverse selection problems, 
most online labor markets provided the reputation 
history of contractors by tracking their previous project 
performance. There is a stream of research examining 
the effect of reputation systems on alleviating the 
adverse selection problems and employers’ awarding 
decisions. First, a good reputation increases the 
probability of being awarded. For the entry-level 
contractors, the review information posted by previous 
employers or the platform can significantly help them to 
get better employment, ceteris paribus [18]. 
Additionally, thanks to the good reputation (comments 
or ratings), contractors can obtain price premiums and 
get more employment [20]. However, it’s also reported 
that rating information driven from public feedbacks 
tends to inflate [7]. Apart from ratings and reviews 
information, the third-party certification is also found to 
be one of the optional signaling mechanisms [21]. On 
the whole, the previous literature suggests that the 
reputation system and third-party certification system 
helps to address the adverse selection problem. 
Once the contractors are awarded, the other type of 
agency problems, the moral hazard problem follows. 
Moral hazard refers to the case when the contractor is 
not motivated to maximize the employer’s utility and 
opportunistically reduces his or her effort [17]. Such 
shirking problems are usually caused by the asymmetric 
effort information and the misalignment between the 
principals’ and agents’ interests. Online labor markets 
are prime examples of markets which are subject to the 
moral hazard problems because of the spatial and 
temporal separation and the lack of effective monitoring 
systems. However, no prior research has examined how 
reputation systems and monitoring systems might 
interact and subsequently influence employers’ and 
contractors’ behavior. 
 
2.2. Contract types 
 
In the software outsourcing industry, there are two 
common contract types, namely, fixed-price contracts 
and time and materials contracts [22]. Fixed-price 
contracts are outcome-based, which means that the 
agent gets a fixed payment based on the amount of 
output [8]. On the other hand, in time and materials 
contracts, the payment should be calculated based on the 
agent’s time in the work process [8]. According to the 
literature on transaction cost economics [23], contract 
design depends on the tradeoff between potential 
renegotiation costs of fixed-price contracts and the cost-
efficiency losses of time and materials contracts [23]. 
Based on the existing literature, many factors might 
influence the contract choice, such as firm size [24], 
reputation [22], project risk [24], business familiarity 
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[25], and to what extent the outcome is sensitive to the 
agent’s or the principal’s effort [26]. Compared to time 
and materials contracts, fixed-price contracts usually 
incur higher costs for information collection and 
negotiating the provision; and higher maladaptation and 
renegotiation costs [27]. On the other hand, time and 
materials contracts usually lead to higher ex-post 
monitoring and auditing costs [10, 11, 23, 27].  
Some researchers consider the trade-off between 
two types of contracts as a “make-or-buy” decision [10]. 
The “buy” choice, corresponding to the fixed-price 
contract, means the external contractor cannot get the 
fixed payment until he or she accomplishes the project. 
Such a choice is preferred when the task is easy to 
define. On the other hand, the “make” choice, which is 
corresponding to the time and material contract, is 
similar to the process of self-production. On the 
incentive side, for the “buy” choice, contractors are 
contracted for the final project outcomes, which 
provides sufficient motivations for them to efficiently 
spend efforts and time on the projects. However, for a 
“make” choice, contractors’ payments are based on the 
amount of time they have spent on the projects. Without 
an effective monitoring system in use, contractors might 
opportunistically shirk, especially when their effort 
could not be well monitored. Therefore, moral hazard 
problems are more severe in a “make” choice [9]. 
However, a “make” choice could contribute to better 
performance and higher client validation quality than 
the other if the monitoring process is effective and 
efficient [11].  In addition, there are other optional 
contract types, including performance-based contracts, 
profit-sharing contracts [11], and hybrid contracts [22]. 
Our paper focuses on the comparison between the fixed-
price and time and materials contracts because they are 
the only two contract type options in most dominant 
online labor markets. 
 
2.3. Monitoring and reputation systems 
 
Monitoring systems and reputation systems are both 
effective mechanisms to alleviate moral hazard 
problems. Monitoring aims to lower the information 
asymmetry by providing more information regarding 
the actions of contractors, while reputation systems 
provide a signal of contractors’ future performance 
based on their performance ratings entered by previous 
employers [28]. It’s found that both the monitoring 
system and the reputation system can independently 
mitigate moral hazard [29-32]. 
On the one hand, monitoring turns the individual 
information about contractors’ actual effort into 
information that the principals could observe. Hence, it 
can increase the likelihood of “shirking” going noticed, 
and then improve the contractors’ effort [32]. There is a 
large body of research supporting that, monitoring 
increases the contractors’ effort and leads to better 
performance [29-31]. On the other hand, reputation 
connects contractors’ performance in the present project 
with the further probability of getting hired. Therefore, 
reputation provides a stimulus to motivate contractors to 
spend more effort on projects [7]. To avoid getting a bad 
reputation, the contractor will be less likely to shirk, 
which implies that the reputation system acts as a 
sanctioning mechanism [15]. However, the monitoring 
system and the reputation system might not work 
independently, which implies that there might be some 
unexpected interaction relationship between two 
aforementioned mechanisms [33, 34]. Since both a well-
designed reputation system and a precise monitoring 
system are effective tools to mitigate moral hazard, the 
introduction of an enhanced monitoring system might 
lower the employers’ reliance on the reputation system, 
and thus weaken the effect of the reputation system. 
Therefore, in such cases, the monitoring systems might 
substitute for the reputation systems in reducing 
contractors’ shirking behavior. However, none of the 
previous IS studies has investigated the potential 
interaction between monitoring systems and reputation 
systems. In summary, both the monitoring system and 
the reputation system help to alleviate moral hazard [29-
31], but it’s still unclear whether there is a substitution 
relation between them. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
 
3.1. Partial substitution between monitoring 
and reputation 
 
If the risk of moral hazard is high, the employer 
prefers to choose the contractor with a high reputation, 
because the reviews and feedbacks entered by previous 
employers help to alleviate information asymmetry and 
act as signals of the reputable contractor’s future effort 
level [28]. However, when an enhanced monitoring 
system is available, the functionality of the reputation 
system might be partially substituted by the monitoring 
system because the monitoring system can lower the 
contractors’ reliance on reputation signals to increase 
the contractors’ effort and lower cost uncertainty. 
Firstly, because of the unobservable contractors’ actual 
effort, employers consider the contractor’s reputation as 
the signal to identify the type of the contractor [19]. For 
example, from the perspective of employers, a reputable 
contractor usually be thought as an agent with high 
expected effort, which suggests employers’ preference 
for the contractors with a high reputation [18]. However, 
when the enhanced monitoring tool is available, the 
employers can verify the contractors’ actual effort and 
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only continue the employment if they find that the 
contractors’ levels of effort are acceptable. Hence, by 
using an efficient monitoring system, the employers 
don’t need to emphasize the contractors’ reputation too 
much because they can ensure the awarded contractors’ 
actual effort through monitoring [16]. Secondly, 
monitoring systems provide more detailed information 
about the contractors’ performance and how to improve 
it, so that it can help to save time and decrease the cost 
uncertainty of hiring inexperienced contractors. Before 
the enhanced monitoring tool is introduced, the 
employers might prefer for contractors with a high 
reputation because of their higher expected effort and 
their smaller cost uncertainty (variance) [8].  However, 
with the enhanced monitoring systems in use, employers 
can have better information about contractors’ actual 
performance and instruct them to perform more 
efficiently. In other words, no matter the contractors 
have a high reputation or not, the employers can keep 
the cost uncertainty at a low level by ensuring that 
contractors are making satisfactory progress. This 
improvement suggests that the monitoring systems 
narrow the difference between the high reputable 
contractors and the low-reputable ones in terms of 
project cost uncertainty. All in all, monitoring systems 
lower employers’ worries about the contractors’ 
shirking behavior and high cost uncertainty, and also 
substitute for the signaling effect of the reputation 
systems. Therefore, we propose the following 
hypothesis:  
H1: After an enhanced monitoring tool is available, 
employers of hourly projects will place a less emphasis 
on worker reputation. 
 
3.2. Monitoring and market competition 
 
Now considering the effect of enhanced monitoring 
systems on the supply side, we expect that more 
contractors will be interested in hourly projects because 
of the lower entry barrier, as the reputable contractor’s 
past reputation on work efforts becomes substitutable. 
On the one hand, the monitoring system lowers the entry 
barrier by lowering employers’ reliance on the 
reputation to mitigate moral hazard problems. Before 
the monitoring system is available, the reputation acts as 
an entry barrier for relatively inexperienced contractors 
who have not yet built their reputation on the online 
labor markets. Consequently, those contractors with a 
good reputation can get better employment while 
acquiring a high rent [18]. However, after the 
introduction of the enhanced monitoring systems, 
employers can obtain the direct information about 
contractors’ effort from the real track records rather than 
the past performance, which implies the entry barrier 
based on reputation prominently drops [33]. Therefore, 
inexperienced contractors are more likely to bid for 
those hourly projects. On the other hand, based on the 
logic of the substitution relationship between the 
monitoring system and reputation we explained earlier, 
the subsequent change in employer preference leads to 
a smaller difference between the contractors with little 
platform experience and those experienced contractors. 
Therefore, the additional value due to a high reputation 
will be greatly removed, and the low-reputable 
contractors’ work will serve as a closer substitute for the 
high-reputable contractors’ work. In such cases, the 
market becomes more competitive. To sum up, we 
expect that the monitoring system facilitates 
competition and formalize the next hypothesis as 
follows: 
H2: After an enhanced monitoring tool is available, 
the number of bidders of hourly projects will be higher. 
 
3.3. Monitoring and employer surplus 
 
In the same vein, because of the potential 
substitution relationship between monitoring systems 
and reputation systems, employers will be less willing 
to pay the price premiums, especially the reputation 
premiums. From the perspective of the supply side 
(contractors), reputable contractors tend to milk their 
reputation by charging the price premiums [20]. 
However, such price premiums don’t guarantee higher 
quality [35]. In such cases, reputation helps to foster 
product nonprice differentiation of the reputable 
contractors’ service. Meanwhile, from the perspective 
of the demand side, because of the potential moral 
hazard problems in the online labor markets, employers 
are uncertain about the effort of contractors without the 
monitoring systems. Therefore, employers would pay 
price premiums to the reputable contractors [36] and 
even consider the reputation premiums as the cost of 
avoiding the shirking behavior [37]. However, since the 
monitoring systems can alleviate the moral hazard 
problems and partially substitute for reputation systems, 
there is no need for employers of hourly projects to pay 
such reputation premiums to address the moral hazard 
problems. Moreover, our argument is also supported by 
Allgulin and Ellingsen’s [38] finding that when 
monitoring is very precise, efficient and cheap, the agent 
tends to become less capable of earning rents and get the 
minimal utility. Therefore, when the agent can be 
monitored perfectly, contractors’ effort level will be 
paid at their corresponding reservation wage [38]. 
Additionally, this argument is also consistent with the 
Efficiency Wage Model, which predicts that intensive 
monitoring leads to low wage premiums [39-41]. Since 
employers no longer need to pay reputation premiums, 
we expect that employer surplus will be higher after the 
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introduction of a monitoring system. So we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H3: After an enhanced monitoring tool is available, 
employers of hourly projects will enjoy a higher surplus. 
 
4. Research methodology 
 
4.1. Date source 
 
Our unique dataset comes from 
www.freelancer.com (Freelancer), which is one of the 
largest online labor market platforms. In 2015, it was 
awarded as 2015 Best Employment Website and 2015 
Best Professional Services Website. In Freelancer, the 
employer can pose his or her project description and 
project budgets. By showing the total project budget, the 
employer indicates that this project adopts a fixed-price 
contract.  If the unit of the project budget is dollars per 
hour, it implies that the employer will make a time and 
materials contract and then the contractor will get paid 
for his or her hourly work.   
Typically, a project will open for bidding for a week 
and any contractor who is interested in it can bid to win 
the project. Before the bidding period expires, the 
employer can review bidders’ basic information, such as 
their nationality, skills, etc. Moreover, Freelancer also 
provides bidders’ previous project experience and their 
former employers’ ratings and comments. Once the 
employer finds the candidate who satisfies him or her 
the most, he or she could award the project to that 
contractor. Our dataset from Freelancer including the 
project information and user information from Oct 1st, 
2013 to February 29th, 2016. The whole sample includes 
36407 projects posted on Freelancer, and 1620 of them 
have finally been awarded to contractors. The definition 
of the project-level variables is shown in Table 1. Our 
dataset includes the following attributes: 1) project-level 
information (i.e. project description, project budget, 
type of contracts, number of bidders, average bid price 
and so on); 2) user-level information (i.e. ratings, 
number of reviews, nationality, etc.).  
 
Table 1 Definitions of related variables 
Variable  Variable definition 
Num_Bid 
total number of bids received by the 
project 
Budget_Min 
the minimum budget set by the 
employer 
Budget_Max 
the minimum budget set by the 
employer 
Employer_Developed 
whether the employer comes from a 
developed country 
Project_title_length number of characters in the project 
title 
Desc Length the length of project description 
Num_Employerreview 
total number of reviews received by 
employers 
Employer_Rating 
average rating score received by the 
employer 
NDA a dummy variable(0,1), =1 if the 
employer and the bidder have 
assigned a NDA contract to protect 
the employer's right 
Featured 
whether the project is a featured 
project 
Nonpublic A dummy variable(0,1), =1 if the 
project is an non-public project 
Fulltime A dummy variable(0,1), =1 if the 
project is an fulltime project 
Language_en A dummy variable(0,1), =1 if the 
project is described in English 
 
4.2. Identification: a quasi-natural experiment 
 
As mentioned before, the information asymmetry 
problem has been a serious issue, especially for hourly 
projects. Because the risk allocation of an hourly project 
is mainly on the principal (the employer), the tradeoff 
between monitoring costs and the uncertainty or risk of 
outcome always troubles the employer  [8]. On August 
2nd, 2015, Freelancer released an IT-enabled monitoring 
system to reduce the difficulty of monitoring. Such a 
new IT artifact is a prime example of the IT-enabled 
behavior-based control tool. The enhanced monitoring 
system can confidently keep a record of the project 
process even with an unstable Internet connection, 
which means that employers didn’t need to keep 
checking the project process frequently because the 
monitoring records would be automatically archived. 
Therefore, this IT-enabled monitoring system alleviates 
the concerns that employers may lose track of project 
progress, and thus lowers monitoring costs. According 
to the comparisons across contract types, the ex-post 
costs of monitoring and auditing for hourly contracts are 
higher [10, 11, 23, 27] and the risk is mainly allocated 
on employers. Therefore, the IT-enabled monitoring 
system should have a stronger effect on hourly projects 
than fixed-price ones. Here, we regard fixed-price 
projects as the control group and examined the effect of 
the enhanced monitoring systems on hourly projects. 
Because the fixed-price projects in the control group can 
efficiently capture the effect of economic cycles or 
platform characteristics, we can identify the treatment 
effect of the enhanced monitoring systems on the 
number of bids and employer surplus.  
 
5. Measures and models 
 
5.1. Conditional Logit Model 
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Assuming that employer choice probabilities satisfy 
the independence irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property 
[42], we estimated the probabilities of employers’ 
awarding decision based on a conditional logit model. 
An employer chooses one contractor from all the 
bidders, and the probability of one bidder being awarded 
is Pr (𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 = 1) ,  which is depending on the 
employer’s utility from hiring him or her. 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝐵𝑗 + 𝛾𝑃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                (1) 
where  𝑋𝑖𝑗  denotes a set of project-bidder paired 
characteristics, such as the price premium of each bid. 
𝑃𝑖  indicates a set of time-invariant project 
characteristics, such as project budget, the length of 
description, etc. 𝐵𝑗  means the bidders’ related 
characteristics, such as bidders’ ratings, whether he or 
she is from a developed country and so on. 𝜀𝑖𝑗 follows 
the i.i.d. type-I extreme value distribution [42]. Since 
the Conditional Logit Model is similar to a fixed-effect 
logit model [43], 𝑃𝑖  doesn’t include any within-group 
variations. So it will not influence the conditional 
probability. Based on our theoretical background, we 
extended the latent utility model as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗 =
(𝐵𝑖𝑑_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗−𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖)
𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖
            (2) 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 +
𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 + 𝛾𝑃𝑖 
+𝛿𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                    (3) 
where 𝛼 is a 4×1 matrix of coefficient estimates and 
each row is corresponding to one of the following four 
groups: 1) 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 = 0, 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 = 0 ; 2) 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 =
1, 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 = 0 ; 3) 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 = 0, 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 = 1 ; 4) 
𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 = 1, 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 = 1. Since there exist strong linear 
correlations between the bidders’ ratings of different 
dimensions, we employed the Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) approach to reduce dimensions and 
generated four components representing four kinds of  
ratings, including 1) PC1: Quality_of_Contractor; 2) 
PC2: Effort_at_Work. Therefore, 𝛽 is a 4×2 matrix of 
coefficient estimates. Each of row represents the 
coefficient estimate result of four components for each 
group. 
 
5.2. DID models 
 
In order to test Hypothesis 3, we create a relative 
employer surplus measure Employer_Surplus, which 
measures the relative percentage of employer surplus 
with respect to the maximum of budget. Here, the 
employer surplus means the gap between the maximum 
of project budget and the final awarded bid price. If the 
price is just equal to the employer’s Willingness To Pay 
(WTP), that is, the maximum of budget, he or she is 
indifferent between hiring and not hiring and the 
employer surplus will be zero. 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑟_𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖
=
(𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖 −  𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖)
𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖
                (4) 
Based on our dataset and research design, we 
estimated the treatment effect based on the Difference-
in-Difference (DID) model [44]: 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑟_𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖  
 +𝛽3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖    (5) 
𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖 +
𝛽3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖           (6)          
In the model, the dependent variable is the total 
number of bids for each project i, 𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖 .  𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 
is the dummy variable indicating whether the project is 
posted after August 2nd, 2015. Contract type is indicated 
by 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖 , which equals to 1 if it is an hourly project, 
and equals to 0 otherwise. The interaction term between 
𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖  and 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖  ( 𝛽3 ) thus identifies the 
heterogeneous effect of the availability of the enhanced 
monitoring systems on fixed-price projects and hourly 
ones. To control for the heterogeneity of projects, we 
also added many project characteristics and employer 
characteristics (𝑣𝑖 ) into the DID models and 𝜀𝑖 denotes 
the error term. 
 
6. Empirical result  
 
6.1. Employer preference and surplus 
 
Based on the result of the Conditional Logit model, 
we can find that before the enhanced monitoring system 
was available, both Quality_of_Contractor and 
Effort_at_Work had significant positive effects on the 
odds of being awarded in hourly projects. Given that 
𝛽𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 was estimated as 0.415 and 𝛽𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 as -
1.835, employers were willing to pay up to  more 22.6% 
of 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑚𝑖𝑛 for 1 unit increase in the Effort at Work 
component, which means that reputable bidders could 
earn high price premiums without the enhanced 
monitoring system in use. However, after the enhanced 
monitoring system was released by Freelancer, neither 
the coefficient of Quality_of_Contractor nor that of 
Effort_at_Work is significant. Additionally, the 
coefficient of Price Premium is significantly negative. 
In such case, employers are only willing to pay more 
7.7% of 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑚𝑖𝑛 in order to hire a bidder with 1 
unit higher in the Effort_at_Work component, which 
implies that employers are less willing to pay high price 
premiums to the bidders with a high reputation than they 
were before. Hence, Hypothesis 1 is also supported. We 
also retested Hypothesis 1 with the linear Fixed Effect 
model, and the results are qualitatively the same. 
Moreover, since employers are less willing to pay the 
price premiums, they can enjoy a higher surplus than 
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before. According to the result of the DID model, the 
interaction term between the after and hourly dummies 
is significantly positive, which suggests that employers 
can reap a higher surplus after the implementation of 
monitoring systems. 
 
Table 2. Estimation results of the Conditional 
Logit Model 
DV: Project_awarded Coefficient 
Fixed_price, Before*Quality  0.055      (0.057) 
Fixed_price, After*Quality  0.090**  (0.037) 
Hourly, Before*Quality  0.052      (0.151) 
Hourly, After*Quality  0.005      (0.081) 
Fixed_price, Before*Effort  0.298***(0.106) 
Fixed_price, After*Effort  0.409***(0.080) 
Hourly, Before*Effort  0.415**  (0.192) 
Hourly, After*Effort  0.142      (0.235) 
Log_b_count_rating -0.030      (0.026) 
Fixed_price, Before*Price_premium -2.086***(0.397) 
Fixed_price, After*Price_premium -1.967***(0.248) 
Hourly, Before*Price_premium -1.835**  (0.863) 
Hourly, After*Price_premium -1.845**  (0.858) 
Bidder_developed  0.619***(0.097) 
Bidder_belong_company  0.030       (0.064) 
Log_bidder_tenure_month -0.064      (0.062) 
Log_bidder_rank -0.316***(0.049) 
Log_bid_order_rank  0.391***(0.043) 
Log_b_hourly_rate  0.020       (0.056) 
Preferredfreelancer  0.161**  (0.074) 
Localfreelancer -0.031      (0.184) 
N   23,438 
Note: a.* p<0.1   ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01 
 
Table 3. DID estimations of the impact of the 
enhanced monitoring systems on 
Employer_Surplus 
DV: 
Employer_Surplus (1) (2) (3) 
Hourly 0.251*** 0.270*** 0.247*** 
 (5.53) (5.93) (5.44) 
After -0.044* -0.050* -0.064** 
 (-1.68) (-1.94) (-2.46) 
Hourly*After 0.114* 0.125* 0.109* 
 (1.73) (1.89) (1.67) 
Budget_Max 0.110*** 0.116*** 0.107*** 
 (11.86) (12.20) (11.13) 
Desc_Length  -0.046*** -0.039*** 
  (-3.18) (-2.67) 
SkillsNum  -0.020 -0.037* 
  (-0.99) (-1.84) 
Employer_Developed  0.019 0.002 
  (0.75) (0.07) 
Num_Bid   0.064*** 
   (5.08) 
Intercept -0.239*** -0.063 -0.180** 
 (-4.86) (-0.87) (-2.37) 
N 1,620 1,620 1,620 
Adj R-squared 0.080 0.086 0.100 
Notes: a. Budget_Max, Desc_Length, SkillsNum, 
Employer_Developed, Bid_Value are log transformed.   
b.* p<0.1   ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01 
 
6.2. Market competition 
 
Based on the result of DID model, we found that the 
coefficient of After (𝛽1) is positive, which means that 
there are more contractors bidding for fixed-price 
projects than before. This increase in Num_Bids might 
result from multiple reasons, such as platform 
popularity, etc. Taking this into consideration, the 
interaction term ( 𝛽3 ) is significantly positive, which 
suggests that after the IT-enabled monitoring system is 
available, the increase in Num_Bids of hourly projects 
is larger than that of fixed-price projects. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2 is supported. Overall, our results of the 
Conditional Logit Model and DID models support all 
the hypotheses.  
 
Table 4. DID estimations of the Impact of the 
enhanced monitoring systems on Num_Bids 
DV: Num_Bids (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 0.310*** 0.367*** 0.197*** 0.201*** 
 (3.39) (4.07) (4.88) (5.13) 
𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 0.229*** 0.211*** 0.187*** 0.179*** 
 (4.37) (4.11) (16.45) (15.89) 
𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 
0.271** 0.239* 
0.168*** 0.157*** 
 (2.03) (1.83) (3.64) (3.51) 
Budget_Max 0.152*** 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.126*** 
 (8.09) (7.59) (37.21) (34.64) 
Desc_Length  -0.118***  -0.113*** 
  (-4.13)  (-16.83) 
SkillsNum  0.273***  0.387*** 
  (6.86)  (40.67) 
Employer_ 
Developed 
 0.275*** 
 0.304*** 
  (5.42)  (27.19) 
Intercept 1.745*** 1.832*** 1.882*** 1.840*** 
 (17.60) (12.76) (86.31) (55.46) 
N 1,620 1,620 36,407 36,407 
Adj R-squared 0.056 0.098 0.049 0.108 
Notes: a. Model (1) and (2) are using only the awarded project 
subsample whose awarded bidder is known.  Model (3) and (4) 
are using the whole project sample;  b. Num_Bids, Budget_Max, 
Desc_Length, SkillsNum are log transformed. There are other 
project-level characteristics, which are also controlled in the DID 
model but their coefficients are not reported in this table. c. * 
p<0.1   ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01. 
 
7. Discussion 
 
7.1. Key findings and implications 
 
In this research, we show the evidence that the 
introduction of the enhanced monitoring systems can 
lower the employers’ preference for the contractors with 
a high reputation, facilitate market competition and 
increase employer surplus. Our estimation results are 
based on a quasi-natural experiment design with fixed-
price projects as the control group and hourly projects 
as the treatment group. The results of our DID models 
and the Conditional Logit Model suggest that after the 
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enhanced monitoring system is introduced, employers 
are less willing to pay the reputation premiums, and thus 
enjoy a higher surplus. This finding implies that there 
exists a partial substitution relationship between the 
monitoring system and the reputation system. 
Moreover, our result also shows that the introduction of 
IT-enabled monitoring systems facilitates competition 
by attracting more bids.  
Additionally, our study also contributes to several 
strands in the online labor market literature. First, it is a 
large-scale empirical research to examine the effect of 
enhanced monitoring systems on both the demand and 
supply side of an online labor market. Though the 
previous literature mainly examining the effect of 
monitoring systems within a firm [16] or a geographical 
area [29], our large dataset can be leveraged to test the 
influence of the monitoring system on the whole online 
labor market within a certain platform. Such an 
advantage enables us to identify the ripple effect of the 
enhanced monitoring systems on the market structure. 
Second, our study extends the previous literature on the 
effect of reputation systems in online markets. 
According to the previous literature on reputation 
systems, reputation acts as a signal of contractor’s future 
performance [28], and motivates them to spend more 
effort [7]. However, our result suggests that its effect 
can be partially substituted by the enhanced monitoring 
system, which alleviates the moral hazard problems by 
efficiently providing more precise information about the 
contractors’ effort [29, 45]. Third, this research suggests 
that the impact of enhanced monitoring systems is not 
limited to mitigating the moral hazard problems and 
improving agents’ productivity [31].  Our study 
suggests that the enhanced monitoring systems help to 
reduce agency costs, raise employer surplus, and 
facilitate market competition. Therefore, our finding 
implies that IT artifacts can have a prominent effect on 
the market structure. 
Our study has several important implications. First, 
this study has implications for the stream of the online 
labor market literature by exploiting a quasi-experiment 
methodology. Specifically, we employ a quasi-
experiment and investigate the effect of enhanced 
monitoring systems on both the demand and supply side. 
The DID model doesn’t only have the advantage of 
controlling for self-selection bias, but also well address 
the time-series heterogeneity issue [16, 46]. Therefore, 
our quasi-natural experiment approach allows us to 
provide a full picture of the impact of enhanced 
monitoring systems on both the demand and supply 
sides.  
Second, our research provides some managerial 
implications to the platform design of online labor 
markets. There is a large body of research suggesting 
that the reputation system helps to mitigate moral hazard 
by serving as both a stimulus for high effort [7] and a 
sanctioning mechanism [15]. Meanwhile, the 
monitoring system is also found to be highly effective 
in improving agents’ performance [29-31]. However, 
our study suggests that there exists a partial substitution 
relationship between these two mechanisms. Hence, our 
study deepens our understanding of the optimal design 
of online labor markets [4] by emphasizing the potential 
interaction effect between the reputation systems and 
monitoring systems. 
 
7.2. Limitations and further research 
 
We acknowledge a number of limitations of this 
research, which opens up avenues for future research. 
First, we note that complete data on the actual employer 
monitoring behavior is not available. However, 
considering there might be only part of the employers 
adopting the monitoring system, our estimated effect of 
the monitoring system tend to be conservative. Second, 
due to data limitations, our research only tested the 
effect of enhanced monitoring systems on the hourly 
contract market by using the observational data from 
only one particular online platform. Further research 
should retest our hypotheses under the context of other 
platforms or other monitoring systems. Finally, we only 
focused on testing the effect of IT-enabled monitoring 
system on employer preference and market competition. 
Future research could collect the reviews and ratings 
data regarding these awarded projects in order to 
explore the effect of the enhanced monitoring systems 
on the project final performance.  
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